The classical view of epistemic logic is that an agent knows all the logical consequences of their knowledge base. This assumption of logical omniscience is often unrealistic and makes reasoning computationally intractable. One approach to avoid logical omniscience is to limit reasoning to a certain belief level, which intuitively measures the reasoning "depth."
Introduction
The standard way of modeling knowledge and belief 1 in epistemic logic is in terms of possible worlds: an agent knows a proposition if and only if it is true in all worlds the agent considers possible. A side-effect of this model is that agents are assumed to be logically omniscient, that is, they know all the consequences of what they know [Hintikka, 1975] .
Unfortunately, the assumption of logical omniscience is inappropriate for most resource-bounded agents like humans or robots: it drives up the computational cost of reasoning and is usually far beyond the their capabilities. Theories of limited belief therefore aim to lift the omniscience assumption.
A number of theories of limited belief have been proposed, predominantly in the 1980s and 1990s [Konolige, 1986; Kaplan and Schubert, 2000; Vardi, 1986; Fagin and Halpern, 1987; Levesque, 1984; Patel-Schneider, 1990; Lakemeyer, 1994; Delgrande, 1995] . A common problem with these approaches is, however, that either their model of limiting belief is too fine-grained or it misses out on simple inferences.
A novel approach to limited belief developed over a series of papers [Liu et al., 2004; Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2013; Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2014; Klassen et al., 2015; Schwering and Lakemeyer, 2016;  Levesque, 2016; Schwering, 2017] attempts to address this issue. The basic idea is to stratify beliefs into belief levels, where the first one, level 0, only comprises the explicit beliefs, that is, what is written down expressly in the knowledge base, and higher belief levels k + 1 draw additional conclusions based on what is believed at level k. Semantically the logic can be characterized using sets of clauses instead of possible worlds, and through case splits, that is, by branching on all the values some term can take and propagating the value.
As an example, consider the following knowledge base:
fatherOf(Sally) = Frank ∨ fatherOf(Sally) = Fred fatherOf(Sally) = n ⊃ rich(n) = for n ∈ {Frank, Fred}.
Here, Sally, Frank, Fred, name distinct individuals ( is an auxiliary name for modeling propositions), whereas fatherOf and rich represent functions in the classical sense. From this knowledge we can deduce rich(Frank) = ∨ rich(Fred) = at level 1 by splitting on all potential fathers of Sally: if Frank is the father, then Frank is rich; if Fred is the father, then he is rich; every other potential father contradicts the first clause. Logics of limited belief in general and the belief level mechanism in particular aim to provide means of controlling the reasoning effort in a comprehensible and explainable way, as contrasted with using a classical reasoner and terminating it after a timeout, for example. The rationale behind the belief level approach is that reasoning at small belief levels should be relatively cheap but still sufficient for the average problem a human or a robot faces during their daily operation. Experiments confirm this hypothesis for the confined domains of Sudoku and Minesweeper [Schwering, 2017] .
Contribution
In this paper, we analyze reasoning with belief levels from the perspective of complexity theory. More precisely, we study the problem of deciding whether a knowledge base entails a query at a certain belief level. For a constant belief level, the problem is indeed in PTIME and hence known to be tractable; the same holds when the knowledge base and query mention only a constant number of function terms.
However, we shall see that if both the belief level and the number of function terms are part of the problem input, then the complexity jumps to PSPACE-complete! This may come as a surprise given Figure 1 : Overview of the classical and parameterized complexity classes relevant for this paper. The classes from the W-hierarchy include parameterized versions of different natural NP-complete problems; the A-hierarchy can be seen as parameterized version of the polynomial hierarchy. C 1 C 2 means C 1 ⊆ C 2 , and C 1 C 2 means that C 2 can be seen as a parameterized analogue of C 1 .
that classical, unlimited reasoning is in co-NP. So (large) belief levels appear to make reasoning harder. Intuitively, the jump is caused by the belief level limiting a possibly scarce resource, namely the number of case splits, which needs to be utilized in an optimal way. The gap between PTIME and PSPACE-completeness calls for a more refined analysis, which we carry out using parameterized complexity theory. We investigate three dimensions of parameters: (1) the belief level, (2) the number of function terms mentioned in the reasoning problem (in the above example, the function terms are fatherOf(Sally), rich(Frank), rich(Fred)), and (3) the number of mentioned so-called standard names (in the example, these names are Sally, Frank, Fred, ). Parameterized complexity theory offers the W-and A-hierarchies to classify problems between PTIME and NP and between NP and PSPACE, respectively. We locate the parameterized variants of our problem within these hierarchies.
A comprehensive overview of the paper's findings is given in Table 1 . Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between the complexity classes we deal with in this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the logic of limited belief and defines the reasoning problem that we shall study. Section 3 introduces a gadget that we use in several reductions. Section 4 begins the complexity analysis from the perspective of classical complexity theory with PTIME and PSPACE results. Section 5 refines the picture using parameterized complexity theory. Then we conclude.
This paper is an extended version of [Chen et al., 2018] .
The Logic of Limited Belief
In its most recent form, the logic of limited belief is a first-order logic with functions, equality, and epistemic modal operators [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2016; Schwering, 2017] . In this paper, we limit our consideration to the quantifier-free case. This section first introduces the syntax and semantics of this logic, and then defines the reasoning problem whose complexity we will study in the remainder of the paper: if we know KB explicitly, do we believe α at level k? The definitions and results of this section are adopted from [Schwering, 2017] with some minor simplifications to ease the technical treatment; these simplifications do not affect the expressivity or complexity of the reasoning task at hand.
The Language
A term is either a standard name (or name for short) or a function term f (n 1 , . . . , n j ), where f is a function symbol and every n i is a standard name. Standard names can be understood as special constants that satisfy the unique-names assumption and an infinitary version of domain closure. We assume an infinite supply of standard names as well as of function symbols.
A literal is an expression of the form t = n or ¬t = n, where t is a function term and n is a standard name. A formula is a literal or an expression of the form ¬α, (α ∨ β), or B k α, where α, β are formulas and k ≥ 0 is a natural number. We read B k α as "α is known at belief level k;" in case k = 0 we also say "α is known explicitly." We use the usual abbreviations t = n, (α ∧ β), (α ⊃ β), and may omit brackets to ease readability.
A formula without B k is called objective. Schwering [2017] has shown that there is a linear Turing reduction from the reasoning problem with nested beliefs to the non-nested case. Hence to simplify the presentation we henceforth assume that α in B k α is objective. As usual, a conjunction of disjunctions of literals is said to be in conjunctive normal form (CNF).
The Semantics
The semantics of limited belief is based on clause subsumption, unit propagation, and case splits. A clause is a set of literals. We abuse notation and identify a non-empty clause { 1 , . . . , j } with the formula ( 1 ∨ . . . ∨ j ). In the rest of this paragraph, we implicitly assume that n, n refer to distinct standard names. A clause c 1 subsumes another clause c 2 iff for every t = n ∈ c 1 , either t = n ∈ c 2 or t = n ∈ c 2 , and for every t = n ∈ c 1 , also t = n ∈ c 2 . We say two literals 1 , 2 are complementary when they are of the form t = n and t = n or of the form t = n and t = n . The unit propagation of a clause c and a literal is obtained by removing from c all literals complementary to . For a set of clauses s, we let UP(s) be the closure of s under unit propagation and subsumption.
The truth relation |≈ is defined between a formula α and a set of clauses s. Intuitively, s acts as a partial model. At belief level 0, α is broken down to clause level and then checked for subsumption by UP(s). Higher belief levels allow to branch on a function term t and all its values n and add t = n to s, which may then trigger unit propagation in UP(s) and thus produce new inferences. The formal definition is as follows:
In the remainder, we refer to these definitions as Rules 1-7. As usual, a formula α is valid, written |≈ α, iff s |≈ α for every set of clauses s.
The belief level k in B k α specifies the number of case splits, which corresponds to the maximum permitted reasoning effort for proving α. Limited belief is monotonic in the belief level:
Moreover, belief stabilizes at a high-enough belief level in the following sense: Lemma 2 Let F contain all function terms in s and α, and let k ≥ |F|. Then s |≈ B k α iff s |≈ B |F | α.
Example
Let us revisit the example from the introduction to illustrate how the semantics works. Let s contain the clauses
and let c denote the clause rich(Frank) = ∨ rich(Fred) = . Then s |≈ B 1 c holds by splitting the cases for Sally's father:
• UP(s ∪ {fatherOf(Sally) = Frank}) rich(Frank) = by unit propagation with the second clause.
• UP(s ∪ {fatherOf(Sally) = Fred}) rich(Fred) = by unit propagation with the third clause.
• UP(s∪{fatherOf(Sally)=n}) for n / ∈ {Frank, Fred} contains the empty clause by unit propagation with the first clause.
In each case, we obtain a clause that subsumes c, so for every potential father n, c ∈ UP(s∪{fatherOf(Sally)= n}).
Classical Semantics
For future reference, we briefly give the classical, "unlimited" semantics of objective formulas. A world w is a function from function terms to standard names. Truth of an objective formula α in a world w, written w |= α, is defined as follows:
We write s |= α to say that for all w, if w |= c for all c ∈ s, then w |= α. Moreover, we write |= α for ∅ |= α.
Limited belief is sound as well as eventually complete with respect to classical semantics in the following sense: Proposition 3 For all finite s and all α, there is a (large-enough) belief level
Proof sketch. Soundness holds because Rule 6 branches over all names. Eventual completeness holds because k can be chosen large enough to split all terms in s, α.
The Limited Belief Reasoning Problem
The fundamental problem of reasoning about limited belief is to decide whether for a given knowledge base KB and a query α, if KB is known explicitly, then α is known at belief level k. In limited belief, KB is typically assumed to be CNF [Lakemeyer and Levesque, 2016] . The formal definition is:
Limited Belief Reasoning Instance: Objective formulas KB and α over function terms F and standard names N , KB in CNF, belief level k ≥ 0. Problem: Decide whether |≈ B 0 KB ⊃ B k α.
We shall investigate this problem using classical complexity theory first and then refine the picture using parameterized complexity theory for parameters k, |F|, |N |. An overview of the results is in Table 1 .
Since the knowledge base in Limited Belief Reasoning is assumed to be in CNF, it corresponds to a unique (modulo UP) set of clauses and the problem can be equivalently expressed as a model checking problem: Lemma 4 Let KB be in CNF with clauses s = {c 1 , . . . , c j }.
Thus and by Lemma 2 and Proposition 3, Limited Belief Reasoning is sound and eventually complete with respect to classical reasoning:
Finally, the following lemma says that in Rule 6 a finite number of function terms and standard names is sufficient. Lemma 5 Let F (resp. N ) contain all function terms (resp. standard names) in s, α, and letn / ∈ N be an additional name. Then s |≈ B k+1 α iff for some t ∈ F, for all n ∈ N ∪ {n}, s ∪ {t = n} |≈ B k α.
Together, Lemmas 4 and 5 give rise to a decision procedure for Limited Belief Reasoning, which works as follows. First, the problem is turned into the equivalent model checking problem using Lemma 4. Then the procedure applies Lemma 5 to reduce the belief level, and finally follows Rules 1-5 to break α down to clause level and check the clauses for subsumption. It is already known that this procedure runs in time O(2 k (|KB| + |α|) k+3 ) [Schwering, 2017] .
Ordering Gadget
It is easy to see that the ordering in which terms are split can be relevant. For example, let s contain the following four clauses:
Then s |≈ B 2 h = n can be proved by splitting f first and then, depending on the value of f , splitting g 1 or g 2 next, but not the other way around. In this section we construct a gadget that generalizes this idea in order to enforce that a goal formula can only be proved by splitting terms in a certain order (at polynomial cost in space). This gadget is used repeatedly in the proofs of Sections 4 and 5. For example, in Theorem 9 we use it to preserve the quantifier ordering of the quantified Boolean formula.
To begin with, the following lemma shows how to make sure that one of the terms from a set F is split no later than at belief level k. We use the notation [k] for {1, . . . , k}. Lemma 6 Let F be a non-empty finite set of function terms, and L be a set of literals where every term from F occurs exactly once. Let B k α be a formula with k ≥ 1. Let s be a set of clauses such that for all t / ∈ F , for some name n, s ∪ {t = n} |= ∈L and s ∪ {t = n} |= ∈L ¬ . Let
Let s k be the least set that includes s and for every ∈ L contains the clauses
Proof. The proof proceeds in four steps.
. By Lemma 5, it suffices to show that for all t ∈ F ∪ {f
• Consider t ∈ {f
• Consider t ∈ F , and let ∈ L be the literal whose left-hand side is t. If is an inequality, let n be its right-hand side. Otherwise, let n be name be such that t = n / ∈ L. Then t = n is not complementary to ¬ , and since all other literals in L have left-hand sides distinct from t, we have that for every ∈ L, t = n is not complementary to
Using this equivalence, another induction on k shows that s k+1 ∪ {t = n} |≈ B k c o k+1 using the same arguments as in the above two cases for f
Proof of Claim 3. Let t ∈ F and let n be an arbitrary name. Then for all names n 1 , . . . ,
Without loss of generality we can assume by Claim 3 and since f
For the converse direction, let t ∈ F , and suppose that for all n, s∪{t=n} |≈ B k−1 ( ∈L ¬ ∨α). Let n be arbitrary. First suppose that t=n is complementary to ¬ for some ∈ L. Then c o k ∈ UP(s k ∪{t=n}). Thus and by assumption,
. Now suppose that t = n is not complementary to any ¬ with ∈ L. There is some ∈ L whose left-hand side is t. If is of the form t = n , then t = n is not complementary to t = n , so n, n are distinct and hence t = n subsumes t = n . Otherwise, if is of the form t = n , then t = n is not complementary to t = n , so n, n are identical and hence t = n subsumes t = n . Hence ¬ ∈ UP(s k ∪ {t = n}). Thus and by Claim 3,
The next lemma represents our gadget. Despite its somewhat intimidating interface, it simply plugs together repeated applications of the previous lemma to completely determine the ordering of splitting terms from F 1 , . . . , F l : Lemma 7 Let F 1 , . . . , F l be non-empty finite sets of function terms, F = F 1 ∪ . . . ∪ F l , and L 1 , . . . , L l be sets of literals such that every term from F i occurs exactly once in L i . Let B k α be a formula with k ≤ l. Let s be a set of clauses such that for all
For every set of clauses s , let s i and c o i be as in Lemma 6 with respect to F i , L i , α. Let α 0 be α and
Proof. Observe that if s |= ∈Li (¬) , then also ((s 1 ) . . .) j |= ∈Li (¬) (*). We show by induction on k that for all t l ∈ F l , . . . , t k+1 and for all n l , . . . , n k+1 ,
The base case k = 0 follows immediately from Rule 5. For the induction step, consider k > 0 and arbitrary t l ∈ F l , . . . , t k+1 ∈ F k+1 and n l , . . . , n k+1 , and suppose the statement holds for k − 1. Then ((s ∪ {t k+1 = n k+1 , . . . ,
iff (by Lemma 6, which is applicable by the assumption that for all t k / ∈ F , for some n k , s ∪ {t k = n k , . . . , t l = n l } |= ∈L k (¬) and (*)) for some
Classical Complexity
This section analyzes the complexity of Limited Belief Reasoning using classical complexity theory. The next tractability result follows from the decision procedure from Section 2.3: Corollary 8 Limited Belief Reasoning with constant k or constant |F| is in PTIME.
Proof. The decision procedure runs in time polynomial with degree k + 3. By Lemmas 1 and 2, k = |F| suffices.
Next, we consider the case where neither k nor |F| is constant. It comes as no surprise that the complexity then significantly increases with the number of case splits. Proposition 3 and Lemma 4 showed that Limited Belief Reasoning is sound and eventually complete with respect to classical reasoning. So clearly, Limited Belief Reasoning must be co-NP-hard, and eventual completeness may suggest that it is co-NP-complete as well. However, limiting the number of case splits further adds to the computational complexity: whereas in classical reasoning a decision procedure may "simply" split all function terms, a decision procedure for limited belief needs to make sure it makes use of the available case splits in the best possible way. This leads to the following result: Theorem 9 Limited Belief Reasoning with constant |N | is PSPACE-complete. The result also holds when |N | is input.
Proof. Membership. The decision procedure from Section 2.3 runs in space O(m + k) where m = |KB| + |α|, since UP(s) can be represented in space O(|s|) because minimal clauses suffice. Hardness. We reduce from True Quantified Boolean Formula, which is PSPACE-complete [Arora and Barak, 2009] . The problem input is a fully quantified Boolean formula Q k x k . . . Q 1 x 1 ψ for Q i ∈ {∀, ∃} and a propositional formula ψ. Without loss of generality, we assume that ψ mentions negation only in front of variables. The question is whether this formula evaluates to TRUE, that is, for all (if
A truth assignment of x 1 , . . . , x j is modeled as a vector M of length k with M i ∈ {FALSE, TRUE} to represent the truth assignment of x i . Let N = { , W} contain two standard names. Let
where f i , f i are pairwise distinct function terms. We define a mapping * from QBF to limited belief formulas: let
We say a truth assignment M and a set of clauses s are compatible iff s = {t 1 = n 1 , . . . , t k = n k } where t i ∈ F i , n i ∈ N i , and if
The idea is as follows. Universally quantified x i are naturally translated to literals f i = so that the truth values TRUE and FALSE of x i correspond to f i = and f i = , respectively. For existentially quantified x i , positive occurrences of x i are replaced with f i = and negative ones with f i = so that the truth values TRUE and FALSE of x i correspond to f i = and f i = . The f i or f i (if Q i = ∃) then need to be split in the appropriate order.
In the remainder of the proof we show that φ evaluates to TRUE iff for some t k ∈ F k , for all n i ∈ N k , . . . , for some t 1 ∈ F 1 , for all n 1 ∈ N 1 , {t 1 = n 1 , . . . , t k = n k } |≈ ψ * (*). The right-hand side of (*) holds iff for some t k ∈ F k , for all n i , . . . , for some t 1 ∈ F 1 , for all n 1 , {t 1 = n 1 , . . . , t k = n k } |≈ α. This in turn can be reduced in polynomial time to Limited Belief Reasoning by Lemmas 7 and 4, which gives us PSPACE-hardness.
We now prove by induction on j that for every truth assignment M of x k , . . . , x j+1 and every s compatible with M , Q j x j . . . Q 1 x 1 φ evaluates to TRUE under M iff for some t j ∈ F j , . . . , for some t 1 ∈ F 1 , for all n 1 ∈ N 1 , s ∪ {t 1 = n 1 , . . . , t j = n j } |≈ ψ * . For j = k this is identical to (*).
• For the base case suppose j = 0, let M be a truth assignment of x k , . . . , x 1 , and let s be compatible with M . We show that ψ evaluates to TRUE under M iff s |≈ ψ * by subinduction on ψ.
For the base case consider a literal. A positive literal
The subinduction steps are trivial.
• For the induction step suppose that the statement holds for j, and let M be a truth assignment of x k , . . . , x j and s be compatible with M . We write M · v for the extension of M with value v ∈ {FALSE, TRUE} for x j+1 .
First consider Q i = ∀. Then Q j+1 x j+1 . . . Q 1 x 1 ψ evaluates to TRUE under M iff for every v ∈ {FALSE, TRUE}, Q j x j . . . Q 1 x 1 ψ evaluates to TRUE under M · v iff (by induction) for every v ∈ {FALSE, TRUE}, for every s v ⊇ s that is compatible with M · v, for some t j ∈ F j , for all n j ∈ N j , . . . , for some t 1 ∈ F 1 , for all n 1 ∈ N 1 , s v |≈ ψ * iff for some t j+1 ∈ F j+1 , for all n j+1 ∈ N j+1 , . . . , for some t 1 ∈ F 1 , for all n 1 ∈ N 1 , s |≈ ψ * .
Now consider Q i = ∃. Then Q j+1 x j+1 . . . Q 1 x 1 ψ evaluates to TRUE under M iff for some v ∈ {FALSE, TRUE}, Q j x j . . . Q 1 x 1 ψ evaluates to TRUE under M · v iff (by induction) for some v ∈ {FALSE, TRUE}, for the unique s v ⊇ s that is compatible with M · v, for some t j ∈ F j , for all n j ∈ N j , . . . , for some t 1 ∈ F 1 , for all n 1 ∈ N 1 , s v |≈ ψ * iff for some t j+1 ∈ F j+1 , for all n j+1 ∈ N j+1 , . . . , for some t 1 ∈ F 1 , for all n 1 ∈ N 1 , s |≈ ψ * .
It is noteworthy that this reduction only uses two standard names. With a more involved reduction, even a single name suffices. Thus even the propositional case (where an atomic proposition p is simulated by p = ) is PSPACE-complete.
Parameterized Complexity
The gap between tractability and PSPACE-completeness from the previous section calls for a more refined analysis. In this section we use parameterized complexity theory to investigate how the parameters k, |F|, and/or |N | affect the complexity of Limited Belief Reasoning.
While many unparameterized problems can be classified with the classical classes PTIME, NP, or PSPACE, parameterized versions of these problems fall into a variety of complexity classes [Flum and Grohe, 2006] . The role of PTIME in parameterized complexity is taken on by FPT, which includes problems parameterized by k that are solvable in f (k) · p(n), where f is a computable function and p a polynomial. Other important parameterized classes come from the W-and A-hierarchies: the classes
can be seen as a parameterized version of the polynomial hierarchy. Figure 1 displays the classes that are relevant for this paper.
Membership in classes of the W-and A-hierarchies can be shown using machines that restrict the number of nondeterministic steps [Chen et al., 2005 ]. An NRAM is a random access machine with an additional nondeterministic EXISTS instruction, which guesses a natural number less than or equal to a certain register and stores the number in that register. A problem is in W[P] iff it is decidable by an NRAM in f (k) · p(n) steps, at most g(k) of them being nondeterministic, using at most the first f (k) · p(n) registers and only numbers ≤ f (k) · p(n). A problem is in AW[P] iff it is decidable by an ARAM with the same constraints, where an ARAM is an NRAM with an additional nondeterministic FORALL instruction, the dual to EXISTS.
Hardness in parameterized complexity is shown by way of fpt-reductions, which are reductions computable in time f (k) · p(n) and such that k ≤ g(k), where k and k are the parameters of the problems reduced from and reduced to, respectively, n is the input size, f and g are computable functions, and p is a polynomial.
Before we start our analysis, we introduce a problem called Quantified Monotone Circuit Satisfiability. A circuit is a directed acyclic graph (V, E) whose vertices are partitioned into input-nodes X of in-degree 0, not-nodes of in-degree 1, and-and or-nodes of in-degree > 0, and a distinguished output-node v 0 of out-degree 0. An assignment S ⊆ X sets inputs S to TRUE and the other ones to FALSE and propagates the values to the output node, whose value then determines whether or not S satisfies the circuit. A monotone circuit contains no not-nodes.
Quantified Monotone Circuit Satisfiability
Instance: A monotone circuit C with input-nodes partitioned into sets X 1 , . . . , X l . Parameter: k 1 + . . . + k l Problem: Decide whether for all S 1 ⊆ X 1 with |S 1 | = k 1 , for some S 2 ⊆ X 2 with |S 2 | = k 2 , . . . , the assignment S 1 ∪ . . . ∪ S l satisfies C.
The following lemma states AW[P]-completeness for the problem, which has been claimed elsewhere before without explicit proof [Abrahamson et al., 1995] . Lemma 10 Quantified Monotone Circuit Satisfiability is AW[P]-complete.
Proof. It is sufficient to reduce from Quantified Circuit Satisfiability, which is AW[P]-complete [Flum and Grohe, 2006] . Consider an instance with circuit C = (V, E) and inputs X 1 , . . . , X l . By De Morgan's laws we can assume the not-nodes are right above the inputs.
Consider a not-node w ∈ V with incoming edge {x, w} ∈ E. By assumption, x ∈ X i for some i ∈ [l]. Observe that for every assignment S i of X i , w is FALSE iff x / ∈ S i iff k i variables in X i \ {x} are set to TRUE iff ≥ k i variables in X i \ {x} are set to TRUE. So it suffices to replace w with the following circuit with inputs X i .
Let
we introduce an or-node v i1,i2,t with the meaning that at least t inputs among x i1 , . . . , x i2 are TRUE, and for every pair of these or-nodes an and-node that takes the pair as inputs. The inputs of v i1,i2,t for i 2 − i 1 > t are the and-nodes of the pairs v i1,i ,t and v i +1,i2,t−t such that i 1 ≤ i < i 2 and t ∈ [t], thus representing that t among x i1 , . . . , x i2 are set to TRUE if for some i and t , t of x i1 , . . . , x i and t − t of x i +1 , . . . , x i2 are TRUE. Then we take v 1,m,ki as the output of the desired subcircuit that replaces w.
The subcircuit is monotone and can be determined time O(k 2 i · m 4 ). We iterate the procedure to eliminate all negations and thus obtain an fpt-reduction to a monotone circuit.
With this lemma we can establish the complexity of Limited Belief Reasoning parameterized by the belief level: Theorem 11 Limited Belief Reasoning with parameter k is AW[P]-complete.
Proof. Membership. We implement the decision procedure from Section 2.3 using an ARAM. Model checking at belief level 0 can clearly be done on a RAM in time p(m) using at most p(m) registers and numbers ≤ p(m), where p is a polynomial and m = |KB| + |α|. At belief level k > 0, we select one of the function terms from F with an EXISTS instruction, and the corresponding name from N ∪ {n} using a FORALL instruction. This amounts to 2 · k nondeterministic steps and a total runtime 2 · k · p(m), and since |F| ≤ m and |N | ≤ m, the problem is in AW[P].
Hardness. We reduce from Quantified Monotone Circuit Satisfiability, which is AW[P]-complete by Lemma 10. Let C = (V, E) be a monotone circuit with inputs X 1 , . . . , X l . We say X i or x ∈ X i is universal (existential) iff i is odd (even).
The idea is as follows. A literal f v = represents that node v is TRUE. The truth assignment of existential X i is selected by splitting some k i of {f x,j | x ∈ X i , j ∈ [k i ]} and skipping all values but . The truth assignment of universal X i is selected by splitting f i,1 , . . . , f i,ki one after another, whose value denotes which variable should be set to TRUE: if the value is n x , it is x. The truth assignment of existential X i is selected by splitting one of {f x,1 | x ∈ X i }, . . . , one of {f x,ki | x ∈ X i }, whose value is set to , which then triggers the corresponding x to be set to TRUE. For universal
For universal X i , let s i be the least set that contains f i,j = n x ∨ f x = for all j ∈ [k i ] and x ∈ X i , and
For existential X i , let s i be the least set that contains f x,j = ∨ f x = for all j ∈ [k i ] and x ∈ X i . Let s be the least set such that s ⊇ s i for all i ∈ [l], and that contains w∈W f w = ∨ f v = for every and-node v and its inputs W = {w | (w, v) ∈ E}, and f w = ∨ f v = for all or-nodes v and all inputs w with (w, v) ∈ E.
In the remainder of the proof we show that for all S 1 ⊆ X 1 with |S 1 | ≤ k 1 , for some S 2 ⊆ X 2 with |S 2 | ≤ k 2 , . . . , the truth assignment S 1 ∪. . .∪S l satisfies C iff for some t 1,1 ∈ F 1,1 , for all n 1,1 ∈ N 1,1 , . . . , for some t 1,k1 ∈ F 1,k1 , for all n 1,k1 ∈ N 1,k1 , . . . , for some t l,1 ∈ F l,1 , for all n l,1 ∈ N l,1 , . . . , for some t l,k l ∈ F l,k l , for all n l,k l ∈ N l,k l , s ∪ {t 1,1 = n 1,1 , . . . , t 1,k1 = n 1,k1 , . . . , t l,1 = n l,1 , . . . , t l,k l = n l,k l } |≈ f v0 = (*). The left-hand side of (*) is equivalent to the Quantified Monotone Circuit Satisfiability problem due to the circuit's monotonicity. The right-hand side of (*) holds iff for some t 1,1 ∈ F 1,1 , for all n 1,1 , . . . , for some t 1,k1 ∈ F 1,k1 , for all n 1,k1 , . . . , for some t l,1 ∈ F l,1 , for all n l,1 , . . . , for some t l,k l ∈ F l,k l , for all n l,k l , s |≈ ∈Li,j ,i∈ [l] ,[j]∈[ki] ¬ ∨ f v0 = since s contains clauses that restrict the domain of f i,j for universal X i to {n x | x ∈ X i } ∪ {W}. This in turn fpt-reduces to Limited Belief Reasoning by Lemma 7, which is applicable here since the F i,j are mutually disjoint, and Lemma 4, which gives us AW[P]-hardness.
We first define when a truth assignment S i ⊆ X i and a set of clauses s are compatible: if X i is universal, then S i , s are compatible iff |S i | = |s | and for every x ∈ S i , for some j ∈ [k i ], f i,j = n x ∈ s ; if X i is existential, then S i , s are compatible iff |S i | = |s | and for every x ∈ S i , for some j ∈ [k i ], f x,j = ∈ s . We now prove by induction on j ≤ l that for a given truth assignment S 1 ∪ . . . ∪ S j the following statement: for all (if j + 1 is odd) / some (otherwise) S j+1 ⊆ X j+1 with |S j+1 | ≤ k j+1 , for some / all S j+2 ⊆ X j+2 with |S j+2 | ≤ k j+2 , . . . , S 1 ∪ . . . ∪ S l satisfies C iff for all compatible s 1 , . . . , s j , for some t j+1,1 ∈ F j+1,1 , for all n j+1,1 ∈ N j+1,1 , . . . , for some t j+1,kj+1 ∈ F j+1,kj+1 , for all n j+1,kj+1 ∈ N j+1,kj+1 , . . . , t l,1 ∈ F l,1 , for all n l,1 ∈ N l,1 , . . . , for some
For j = 0 this is identical to (*).
• For the base case j = l we show by subinduction on the depth of C that v ∈ V is satisfied iff
The base case holds since S i and s i are compatible and by construction of s. The subinduction step follows immediately by construction of s.
• For the induction step suppose the claim holds for j + 1.
First suppose j + 1 is odd. Then for all S j+1 ⊆ X j+1 with |S j+1 | ≤ k j+1 , for some S j+2 ⊆ X j+2 with |S j+2 | ≤ k j+2 , . . . , S 1 ∪ . . . ∪ S l satisfies C iff (by induction) for all S j+1 ⊆ X j+1 with |S j+1 | ≤ k j+1 , for all compatible s 1 , . . . , s j+1 , some t j+2,1 ∈ F j+2,1 , for all n j+2,1 ∈ N j+2,1 , . . . , for some t j+2,kj+2 ∈ F j+2,k2 , for all n j+2,k2 ∈ N j+1,kj+2 , . . . , t l,1 ∈ F l,1 , for all n l,1 ∈ N l,1 , . . . , for some t l,k l ∈ F l,k l , for all n l,k l ∈ N l,k l , s ∪ s 1 ∪ . . . ∪ s j ∪ {t 1,1 = n 1,1 , . . . , t 1,k1 = n 1,k1 , . . . , t l,1 = n l,1 , . . . , t l,k l = n l,k l } |≈ f v0 = iff for all compatible s 1 , . . . , s j , for some t j+1,1 ∈ F j+1,1 , for all n j+1,1 ∈ N j+1,1 , . . . , for some t j+2,kj+2 ∈ F j+2,k2 , for all n j+2,k2 ∈ N j+1,kj+2 , . . . , t l,1 ∈ F l,1 , for all n l,1 ∈ N l,1 , . . . , for some
The case for even j + 1 is analogous. AW[P] is quite natural due to the alternation of existential and universal quantifications of case splits in Lemma 5. When the number of standard names |N | becomes a parameter as well, this gives us leverage to replace the nondeterministic FORALL steps that select the standard names with a simple loops. It is therefore not surprising that Limited Belief Reasoning parameterized by k and |N | is in W[P], the hardest NP-analogue of the W-hierarchy. The following result shows that the problem is in fact
Membership in
Proposition 12 Limited Belief Reasoning with parameters k and |N | is W[P]-hard. The result also holds when |N | is constant.
Proof. Membership. We build an NRAM. For k = 0, it behaves like the ARAM in Theorem 11. For k > 0, we select a function term from F with EXISTS and loop over all names in N ∪ {n}. This amounts to (|N | + k) k nondeterministic steps and total runtime
Hardness. We reduce from Weighted Monotone Circuit Satisfiability, which is W[P]-complete [Abrahamson et al., 1995] . Weighted Circuit Satisfiability corresponds to Quantified Weighted Circuit Satisfiability with only existentially quantified variables, and the reduction is identical to one from Theorem 11 for a single block of existential variables. The reduction uses only a single name .
Next we consider the case where |F| becomes a parameter. The below theorem specifies co-W[P]-completeness: Theorem 13 Limited Belief Reasoning with parameters k and |F| is co-W[P]-complete. The result also holds when k is input.
Proof. Membership. We show that the co-problem is in W[P] using an NRAM that finds a falsifying assignment of names for all split terms. As in Theorem 11, the case k = 0 is straightforward. For k > 0 we loop over all function terms in F and for each we select a standard name from N ∪ {n} with EXISTS. This amounts to |F| k nondeterministic steps, which by Lemma 2 can be generalized to |F| |F | . The total runtime is hence |F| |F | · p(m), so the problem is in co-W[P].
Hardness. We reduce from the complement of Weighted Anti-Monotone Circuit Satisfiability, which is W[P]-complete [Flum and Grohe, 2006] . A circuit is anti-monotone when all inputs have out-degree 1 and feed into a not-node and there are no other not-nodes except those on top of some input. Let C = (V, E) be an anti-monotone circuit with inputs X. For every x ∈ X we denote the associated not-node by
The idea is to represent that a node v is set to FALSE by f = n v . The truth assignment is selected by splitting f 1 , . . . , f k . Truth of an input x is represented by f i = n vx for some i ∈ [k], which triggers f = n nx ; these values are propagated to the output node, so that f = n v0 indicates that the circuit is falsified.
For every i ∈ [k], let L i = {f i = W} and let s i be the least set that contains f i = n vx ∨ f = n vx for every x ∈ X, and x∈X f i = n vx ∨ f i = W. Let s be the least set such that s ⊇ s i for all i ∈ [k], and f i = n vx ∨ f j = n vx for every i, j ∈ [k] with i = j and x ∈ X, and w∈W f = n w ∨ f = n v for every or-node v and its inputs W = {w | (w, v) ∈ E}, and f = n w ∨ f = n v for all and-nodes v and all inputs w with (w, v) ∈ E.
Let N = {n vx | x ∈ X}. In the remainder of the proof we show that every truth assignment S ⊆ X with |S| = k falsifies C iff for all n 1 , . . . , n k ∈ N , s ∪ {f 1 = n 1 , . . . , f k = n k } |≈ f = n v0 (*). The right-hand side of (*) holds iff for all n 1 , . . . , n k , s ∪ {f 1 = n 1 , . . . , f k = n k } |≈ ∈Li,i∈[k] ¬ ∨ f = n v0 since s contains clauses that restrict the domain of f i to N ∪ {W}. This in turn fpt-reduces to Limited Belief Reasoning by Lemmas 7 and 4, which gives us co-W[P]-hardness.
We first define that a truth assignment S ⊆ X and a set of clauses s are compatible iff |S| = |s | and for every x ∈ S, for some i ∈ [k], f i = n vx ∈ s . We now prove (*).
For the only-if direction suppose that every S ⊆ X falsifies C and consider some n 1 , . . . , n k ∈ N . Let s = {f 1 = n 1 , . . . , f k = n k }. If for some i = j, n i = n j , then by construction, s ∪ s |≈ f = n v0 . Hence x ∈ S iff for some i, f i = n vx ∈ s . Thus and by construction of s, S falsifies v x iff f = n vx ∈ UP(s ∪ s ). By induction on the depth of C, f = n v0 .
For the if direction suppose that for all n 1 , . . . , n k ∈ N , s ∪ {f 1 = n 1 , . . . , f k = n k } |≈ f = n v0 and consider some S ⊆ X. Choose n 1 , . . . , n k such that x ∈ S iff for some i, f i = n vx ∈ s . Then by construction of s, S falsifies v x iff f = n vx ∈ UP(s ∪ s ). By induction on the depth of C, S falsifies v x iff f = n vx ∈ UP(s ∪ s ).
Finally, the only remaining case is when Limited Belief Reasoning is parameterized by both |F| and |N |: Proposition 14 Limited Belief Reasoning with parameters |F| and |N | is in FPT. The result also holds when |N | is constant.
Proof. The decision procedure for belief level k corresponds to a tree of height 2 · k with alternating branching factors |F| and |N | + k. The runtime of the decision procedure is hence (|F| · (|N | + k)) k · p(m) for some polynomial p and m = |KB| + |α|. By Lemma 2, this generalizes to (|F| · (|N | + |F|)) |F | · p(m).
Conclusion
We have analyzed the complexity of Limited Belief Reasoning. While tractable for constant belief levels, the complexity jumps to PSPACE-complete in the general case. Using parameterized complexity theory, we showed how parameterized versions of the problem populate the space between these two extremes.
We believe our findings are relevant to the future development of the theory of limited belief. In particular, the insight that the limited belief level can actually increase the computational cost should be considered in future versions.
In light of PSPACE-completeness, one might implement a reasoning system using an off-the-shelf QBF-solver. Also, limited belief and the available reasoning system [Schwering, 2017] may be suitable as a modeling language for other problems in PSPACE.
So far, we have only considered Limited Belief Reasoning without first-order quantification; lifting this restriction would be a natural next step. Moreover, additional parameters could be studied, for example, parameters exploiting the structure of the knowledge base and the query, like backdoors [Gaspers and Szeider, 2012] .
Another interesting question is whether our findings carry over to other approaches to resource-bounded reasoning, such as [D'Agostino, 2015] , which uses a similar splitting technique.
